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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Petitioner/Appellant's ("Wife")
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
BY APPELLANT
Wife has correctly stated the sole issue for appeal in this case, that is, whether
or not the trial court's findings and conclusions support a finding of Wife's
cohabitation terminating Husband's alimony obligation. However, pursuant to U. R.
App. P. 24(b)(1) Respondent/Appellee ("Husband") supplements the standard of
review of the cohabitation issue as follows.
Wife is correct that whether or not an individual was "residing" with another for
the purpose of determining cohabitation under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) is a mixed
question of fact and law. See Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) {citing Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)).
However, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings, Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(holding the
weight of the evidence supported a cohabitation finding)1 and will defer to the trial
court'sfindingsof fact "unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous," and review

1

Other citations omitted.

1

the trial court's ultimate conclusion of law for correctness, Pendleton, 918 P. 2d at
160.2
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Applicable is the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9):
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000).
There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations the interpretation of which is determinative or of central importance to the
sole issue in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of The Case. Course of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
Husband agrees with Wife's statements as set forth in her Nature of the Case

and Course of Proceedings. However, Husband supplements the Statement of Facts
in Wife's brief for the purpose of rectifying her omissions, to make necessary
corrections and modifications and to provide the factual bases for the trial court's
ruling and direction on remand. To the extent Husband disputes Wife's statement of
facts he has supplemented the same below.

2

Husband acknowledge's the trial court retains discretion in deciding divorce cases, as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. However, Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871, 872-73 (Utah 1979), cited by Wife,
is a case involving property settlement incident to divorce, not cohabitation. See id. at 871.
2

B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Husband and Wife, married on December 26, 1986 in Weber County,

Ogden, State of Utah . R. 17.
2.

The parties were granted a divorce on or about October 13,1998. R. 413.

Facts Related to Wife's Cohabitation With Mitchell Adams.
3.

During her marriage Wife met Mitchell Adams ("Mr. Adams")at a

seminar in Denver, Colorado, in approximately March or 1997. R. 515: 70 (vol. I);
R. 515: 3-4 (vol. II).
4.

During that first seminar which lasted four or five days, Wife and

Mitchell Adams became intimate and had sexual intercourse. R. 515: 4-5 (vol. II).
5.

Wife and Mr. Adams spoke by telephone and corresponded via e-mail.

R. 515: 5-6 (vol. II).
6.

In April of 1997, Wife and Mr. Adams met at another seminar, where

they spent two or three days in St. Augustine, Florida, and one day, the day of the
seminar, in Orlando, Florida. The couple met because they wanted to see each other
and because they were staffing a one-day seminar in Orlando. During both their stay
in St. Augustine and in Orlando, they shared a hotel room, and had sexual contact and
intercourse R. 515: 6-8, 39 (vol. II).
7.

After the meetings in Florida during April of 1997, Wife and Mr. Adams

maintained contact through the telephone and via e-mail. R. 515: 8 (vol. II).
8.

Wife and Mr. Adams next met in California over the Memorial Day

3

weekend of 1997. Wife took her daughter Aarika to a Tony Robbins seminar in
Anaheim, California. Wife and Mr. Adams met face-to-face and had sexual relations
and intercourse. Although the seminar was for four or five days, Wife and Mr. Adams
saw each other only the first day and night as Husband thereafter arrived in Anaheim.
R. 515: 8-10 (vol. II).
9.

Following their meeting in California, Wife and Mr. Adams continued

their relationship and communicated with each other by telephone and e-mail, until
Wife decided to try and work on her relationship with Husband. Wife did not contact
Mr. Adams after that time until New Year's Eve 1997 or New Year's Day 1998, when
she initiated contact with Mr. Adams and decided to continue the relationship that
began in 1997. R. 515: 10-11 (vol. II).
10.

In approximately April 199 8 Mr. Adams flewfromhis home in Deltona,

Florida to Utah to see Wife, and spent approximately four or five days in Sherwood
Hills near Logan and in Ogden. During his stay in Utah, Mr. Adams saw Wife every
day and they had sexual contact and engaged in intercourse every day. R. 515:12-15
(vol. II).
11.

Mr. Adams again returned to Utah in May 1998 to see Wife. He

remained in Utah for four or five days staying at a hotel in Brigham City where he saw
Wife daily and they daily engaged in sexual intercourse. Mr. Adams considered the
couple's status as "dating and working on furthering our relationship when she got
divorced." The couple may have discussed, but made no concrete plan at that time,
to get married. R. 515: 15-17 (vol. II).
4

12.

Mr. Adams next trip to Utah to see Wife occurred in late June or early

July of 1998. He remained in Utah for an extended period of time, two or three
months through August 1998. He stayed at a hotel and saw Wife at the hotel and at
her home on Park Drive in Mantua, Utah. The couple saw each other daily or every
other day and engaged in sexual contact and intercourse. During this extended stay
in Utah, Mr. Adams returned to his home in Florida on a couple of occasions, once to
take care of business, and the other to take Wife's son Derrick Dibble to Florida and
enroll him in school before the school year commenced. Wife allowed Mr. Adams to
take Derrick to his home in Florida, where Derrick began residing, and enroll him in
school. R. 515: 17-23, 50,146 (vol. II).
13.

The couple became engaged on or about July 11, 1998, before Wife's

divorce was final. When Mr. Adams proposed, he gave her an engagement ring and
Wife accepted the marriage proposal. R. 515: 19 (vol. II)
14.

On or about September 18,1998 Wife and five of her children, Derrick

Dibble, Aarika Dibble, Dax Dibble, Aalexis Dibble, Damien Dibble, and Aarika's
boyfriend Matt Zerkle moved from the State of Utah to Florida where Mr. Adams
lived and resided with him at his home at 642 Fort Smith Boulevard, Deltona, Florida,
22738. R. 515: 72-3, 91 (vol. I); R. 515: 3,144 (vol. II). Wife intended at the time
she and the children moved to Florida with Mr. Adams that they would be residing in
Deltona on a permanent basis. R. 515: 87 (vol. I). Husband understood that Wife
intended to reside permanently in Florida. R. 515: 129 (vol. I). Husband's

5

understanding arose in part from his knowledge of Wife's and Mr. Adams'
relationship over the previous two years. R. 515: 193 (vol. I).
15.

Wife rented two U-haul trucks, packed all of her belongings and the

children's belongings and moved to Florida leaving no other residence anywhere and
intending to reside in Florida and to marry Mr. Adams. R. 515: 23-24, (vol. II)
16.

At the time of the move all of the parties children were of school age. R.

515: 73 (vol. I). Wife withdrew the children from school in the State of Utah and
enrolled them in elementary or high school as appropriate, in Florida. R. 515: 73-5
(vol. I). When she later moved back to the State of Utah, Wife withdrew the children
from school in Florida and registered them in school in Utah. R. 515: 78 (vol. I).
17.

When Wife and her children arrived in Florida they all resided with Mr.

Adams at his home, and further resided with Mr. Adams continuously from the day
they arrived in Florida until the day the left and moved back to Utah on Thanksgiving
Day 1998. R. 515: 74-5, 78 (vol. I); R. 515: 24 (vol. II).
18.

During his testimony, Wife's witness, her son Derrick Dibble testified he

considered Mr. Adams' home his home. R. 515: 150 (vol. II).
19.

During the time Wife and her children lived with Mr. Adams they kept

clothing and a few personal items in the house, including a mattress, a photo album,
and other necessaries, R. 515: 76, 78-9 (vol. I); R. 515: 28 (vol. II), but kept the
majority of their belongings in the garage at Mr. Adams' residence, R. 515:54-5 (vol.
II), and in the U-hauls parked in front on Mr. Adams' residence until the U-haul
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company repossessed the U-haul trucks. Wife then rented a storage unit in Florida
where she stored the remainder of their belongings. R. 515: 135-36 (vol. II).
20.

Wife and her children had a key to Mr. Adams' home, R. 515: 25 (vol.

II),and werefreeto come and gofromhis home without restriction. R. 515:76-7 (vol.
I); R. 515: 25 (vol. II).
21.

Wife purchased groceries while living at Mr. Adams residence for

herself, the kids, R. 515: 77,81 (vol. I); R. 515: 55-6 (vol. II), and Wife, the children,
and Mr. Adams would eat dinner together at the home when everyone was home for
dinner at the same time. R. 515: 89 (vol. I); R. 515: 55-6 (vol. II).
22.

Wife and the children enjoyed unrestricted and free access to the

telephone in the Adams home. R. 515: 77 (vol. I); R. 515:27 (vol. II). Wife gave Mr.
Adams' phone number out to various people to contact her and the children in Florida
and in fact she gave Husband Mr. Adams' number to contact the children. R. 515: 78
(vol. I). Mr. Adams did request that either the children or Husband cover the costs
associated with the children's long distance phone calls to their father. R. 515: 14344, 146 (vol. II).
23.

Wife received mail at Mr. Adams' post office box, as did the children.

R 515:27,56-7 (vol. II). Wife also obtained another post office box. R. 515:78 (vol.
I)24.

Although Wife slept on one of the mattresses with her young children in

a room separatefromthat of Mr. Adams, R. 515:79 (vol. I), she and Mr. Adams had
sexual relations and intercourse on almost a daily basis while she was living with him
7

in Florida. R. 515: 24-5 (vol. II). Wife also testified that she would not be inclined
to have slept with Mr. Adams with children in the house. R. 515: 93 (vol. I).
25.

Wife, her children and Mr. Adams attended church together a couple of

times while Wife was residing in Florida. R. 515: 79 (vol. I).
26.

Wife purchased an automobile when she arrived in Florida which she

parked in front of the Adams home, a Volkswagen Fox, R. 515: 80 (vol. I); R. 515:
26 (vol. II), and Mr. Adams purchased a Volkswagen Bug for Wife's child Derrick to
drive while he was in Florida. R. 515:25-7 (vol. II). When Wife moved back to Utah
she agreed to purchase the BugfromMr. Adams, but remitted only partial payment
to him for the automobile. R. 515: 578 (vol. II).
27.

Wife and Mr. Adams intended that Wife would move to Florida with the

children, the couple would get married and live together in a home Mr. Adams was to
purchase. R. 515: 59 (vol. II). Pursuant to this agreement, Mr. Adams took steps to
purchase a martial residence for the family, the 1730 Lorraine Drive home. Wife and
four of her children were going to live in the Lorraine Drive home, and Derrick Dibble
and Mr. Adams were going to live in Mr. Adams' current residence until the couple
were formerly married. The family intended to live in the marital/family residence
together after that time. Mr. Adams was unable to purchase the home, however,
because of problems associated with the closing. R. 515:59-60 (vol. II). Because the
home was not purchased, the couple and her children simply lived in the home Mr.
Adams already owned. R. 515: 28-9, 52-3 (vol. II).
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28.

Mr. Adams did not request Wife to pay rent, utilities, or any other costs

associated with the residence, nor did he anticipate she would pay any costs associated
with the Lorraine Drive home. He intended to support the family as a husband would.
R. 515: 29, 54-5 (vol. II).
29.

Wife, Mr. Adams and the children participated in family-oriented

activities while they were all living in the same house together in Florida. They went
to movies, the amusement parks, Busch Gardens and Sea World, and Mr. Adams
occasionally assisted the children with their homework. R. 515: 29-30 (vol. II).
30.

Even before Wife moved to Florida with her children, she and Mr. Adams

engaged in family-oriented activities. Mr. Adams flew to Utah on one occasion to
attend the L.D.S. missionary farewell of one of Wife's children, Dustin Dibble. R.
515: 48 (vol. II).
Wife's Testimony Related to Cohabitation.
31.

Wife testified at trial that she and Mr. Adams were only friends. R. 515:

71 (vol. I).
32.

Wife testified her relationship with Mr. Adams did not changefromthat

ofjust friends until July or August of 1998 when the couple became engaged. R. 515:
71, 102 (vol. I).
33.

Wife claimed the children had a residence address in Florida of 1730

Lorraine Drive. R. 515: 76 (vol. I). However, as stated in the Record, supra, no one,
not the children, not Wife, not Mr. Adams, ever resided at Lorraine Drive during the
time Wife moved to Florida in September 1998 until Thanksgiving Day 1998 when
9

she moved back to the State of Utah. Wife, the parties' children, and Mr. Adams all
lived together continuously at Mr. Adams' residence during the relevant time frame.
R. 515: 76 (vol. I).
34.

Wife claimed she did not have a key to Mr. Adams' home, but that she

and her children were never denied access to the home and came and went as they
pleased. R. 515: 76-7 (vol. I).
35.

Wife testified she had no mailing address at the residence but that she

purchased and received mail at her own post office box. R. 515: 78 (vol. I).
36.

Wife testified that she and Mr. Adams had no sexual contact or

intercourse whatsoever during the period of time she was engaged to Mr. Adams and
residing with him in Florida. R. 515:79-80 (vol. I). Wife further testified that she and
Mr. Adams had no physical contact during the time she lived in Florida in his home.
No kissing, petting, hand holding, or anything else. R. 515: 83 (vol. I). However,
Wife's witness and son, Derrick Dibble testified on cross-examination,
Q.

In connection with the - a couple of questions toward the end that you

were asked by counsel, you observed your mother and Mr. Adams, as I understood
your testimony, holding hands and hugging, that sort of thing?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Did you ever observe them kissing each other?

A.

I'm sure I did.
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Q.

There would be, of course, no way that you would know whether or not

the two of them were engaged in any sort of sexual relations outside of your presence,
you wouldn't have any idea about that?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

All right. You were aware, as I understand it, that your mother and Mr.

Adams were in fact engaged to be married at a point in time, you knew that, didn't
you?
A.

That's my understanding.

Q.

You knew that when you left Utah to move to Florida, at least the two of

those folks, your mom and Mr. Adams, anticipated a home that would be there, in
terms of size, to accommodate, if I can use that term, the new family?
[objection overruled]
Q.

You were aware of the fact that this new home that was to be made

available in Florida was for the kids and your mom and Mr. Adams when they got
married, weren't you?
A.

When they got married, yes.
* * * *

Q.

Were you aware that your mother and Mr. Adams were going to get

married at the time you left and moved to Florida?
A.

She had a ring on her finger, but I never really talked to her about it.
* * * *
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Q.

And were you required, in enrolling [in school in Florida], to give an

address of where you resided to the people at the school?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you give them the address of Mr. Adams's residence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That would be the place where you were living?

A.

Uh-huh.

R. 515: 139-40,141-43 (vol. II).
37.

Wife stated she spent no time in Mr. Adams' bedroom doing anything

other than talking, and that the only reason they talked in the bedroom is because it
was quieter than other rooms in the house. R. 515: 83-4 (vol. I). Yet, on re-direct
examination by Wife's counsel, Wife's son Derrick Dibble testified:
Q.

Did you ever observe anything that would cause you to believe that your

mother was having a sexual relationship with Mr. Adams while in that house?
A.

Umm, I pretty much stayed out of it. I didn't want to think about things

like that.
Q.

You didn't see anything, you don't know one way or the other?

A.

I didn't really think about it.

R. 515: 145-46 (vol. II).
38.

On cross-examination Wife testified she never intended to live with

Mitchell Adams in a "husband and wife situation," R. 515:90 (vol. I), despite the fact
that she and Mr. Adams were engaged at the time she and the children moved to
12

Florida. R. 515: 20 (vol. II). Wife claimed she moved to Florida with the intent,
among other things, to get to know Mr. Adams and had not yet determined whether
she would marry Mr. Adams. R. 515: 91 (vol. I), and then later testified:
Q.

And why was [the engagement] broken off [approximately one to two

weeks after the couple became engaged]?
A.

Because I didn't want to marry him.

Q.

And was that just because you got to know him better or some other

reason?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay. So when you went to Florida you had no intention of marrying

[Mr. Adams] then?
A.

No.

R. 515: 103-04 (vol. I). And then on further redirect by Husband's counsel:
Q.

You moved you and your children from the state of Utah to Florida

without any expectation of having a permanent relationship with Mr. Adams, is that
your testimony?
A.

Yes.

R. 515: 106 (vol. I).
39.

Wife testified that she did not intend to reside with Mr. Adams if they

were not husband and wife, R. 515: 90 (vol. I), and then not thirty seconds later
testified on cross-examination by her counsel as follows:
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Q.

Did you anticipate that if you got a house you would rent that [Mr.

Adams] would have resided in that home or had you thought that far ahead?
A.

Umm, I planned on him being with us.

R. 515: 92 (vol. I). Wife then further testified on cross-examination by her counsel:
Q.

As of November the 26th what was your reason for moving back to Utah?

A.

Because I didn't have any place to live. I couldn't rent any place, I

couldn't find a house to rent.
Q.

And you did not want to live in Mr. Adams's home anymore?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Because I never intended to live with him in the first place.

R. 515: 93 (vol. I).
40.

Wife claimed she and Mr. Adams were no longer engaged when she

moved to Florida in September 1998. R. 515: 103 (vol. I).
41.

After Mr. Adams and Derrick Dibble's testimony regarding Wife and

Mr. Adams' common residency and sexual contact, the trial court broke for recess and
upon return Wife's counsel called her to the witness stand where, for the first time,
Wife claimed the reason she ended the relationship with Mr. Adams was because of
mental and physical abuse while she was living with him in Florida. Wife also
changed her story and testified that she found a place to live in Utah when she came
with the children to Utah in October 1998 for Husband's wedding. R. 515: 168-90
(vol. II).
14

42.

Wife's counsel did not ask Jaylynn Cobbley, Wife's best friend and

confidant one question about whether Mr. Adams physically abused Wife while she
was residing in Florida. R. 515:223-41 (vol. I); R. 515: 71-80 (vol. II). In fact when
Wife's counsel asked Ms. Cobbley if Wife told her why she was "afraid" of Mr.
Adams, Ms. Cobbley responded, "No. Just that he was very strange." R. 515:74 (vol.
II).
43.

When asked about her observation of the general atmosphere in the house

and her mother and Mr. Adams' relationship, Wife's daughter and witness Aarika
Storey testified only that if Mr. Adams was in a bad mood everyone stayed away from
him, and that he "seemed to be a lot different than what he turned out to be." She
further testified,
Q.

What did you notice about him to cause you to draw that conclusion?

A.

He just was really ornery. He didn't really seem to want to be bothered

and so everybody just kind of stayed away from him.
Q.

Did you see that same type of demeanor towards your mother?

A.

Yeah. She pretty much stayed away from him too.

R. 515: 157-58 (vol. II).
Mr. Adams' Testimony on Cohabitation.
44.

Mr. Adams testified that the couple remained engaged even after Wife

movedfromhis home and returned to the state of Utah. He testified that for Christmas
1998 he presented Wife with a necklace for Christmas, that he visited her and the
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children in Utah in December 1998 and the couple did not break off their engagement
until December 1998 or January 1999. R. 515: 20-1, 58 (vol. II).
45.

Wife's counsel cross-examined Mr. Adams with the stated intent of

impeaching his testimony and challenging his truthfulness and credibility. R. 515:36
(vol. II). Wife's counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Adams, however, did nothing
more than reinforce the credibility of his testimony and the incredibility of Wife's
testimony as set forth above. R. 515: 31-58 (vol. II).
The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions on Wife's Cohabitation.
46.

The trial court explained during trial that if Mr. Adams' testimony were

to be believed, that Wife cohabited after the time the divorce decree was entered on
or about October 13, 1998. R. 515: 44 (vol. II).
47.

The trial court, weighing the testimony of the parties and all witnesses

found Wife's testimony regarding her relationship with Mr. Adams and her living
arrangements and intentions related thereto, while in Florida, to be incredible. The
itrial court accepted, as more credible, the testimony of Mr. Adams. Transcript of
Videotape March 22, 2001, pp. 3-4.
48.

The trial court found that Wife met Mitchell Adams ("Mr. Adams") at a

seminar in Colorado on or about March, 1997, attended by Wife and Mr. Adams. The
trial court further found that they commenced a sexual relationship and had sexual
intercourse at that time. Findings of Fact, 12; R. 490.
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49.

The trial court found that thereafter Wife and Mr. Adams had several

communications by telephone and e-mail and that they met each other face-to-face
over the next several months in Colorado, California, Florida and Utah. The trial court
found that during each of these occasions the parties engaged in intimate relations and
had sexual intercourse. Findings ofFact, Tf 3; R. 490.
50.

The trial court found that during the summer of 1998, Mr. Adams

traveled to the State of Utah where he conducted some business but his purpose was
also to visit with Wife, which the trial court found he did. The visitations included
meetings between Mr. Adams and Wife at hotels in Ogden, Brigham City and Wife's
residence in Mantaway, Utah. The trial court further found that during each of these
visits Wife and Mr. Adams were intimate with each other and engaged in sexual
intercourse. Findings of Fact, ^ 4; R. 491.
51.

The trial court found that during the late summer of 1998, Wife and Mr.

Adams became engaged and Mr. Adams gave Wife an engagement ring which, at the
date of trial, had not been returned to Mr. Adams, although the trial court found that
in the fall of 1998, while in Florida, Wife tendered the ring to Mr. Adams but that the
ring was subsequently returned to Wife. Additionally, the Court finds that for the
1998 Christmas holiday, Mr. Adams gave Wife a necklace which is still in her
possession. Findings of Fact, f 5; R. 491.
52.

The trial court found that Wife made a determination in the early fall of

1998 to move with her children to the State of Florida. The trial court found that while
Wife's residence location and that of her children, together with the boyfriend of one
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of Wife's children, was disputed, the trial court found by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Adams decided to acquire a larger residence than the one in which
he was residing in Deltona, Florida, at the time of Wife's move to accommodate Mr.
Adams, Wife and her children. The trial court found that by reason of some financing
difficulties, the larger residence was not purchased, but that Wife with her family and
a boyfriend of one of her children, moved into Mr. Adams' residence and resided there
as their sole residencefrommid-September, 1998 to the Thanksgiving holiday of 1998
when Wife and her children moved back to the State of Utah. The trial court further
found that during this period of time Wife had no other residence anywhere. Findings
of Fact,] 6; R. 491-92.
5 3.

The trial court found that during Wife' s residence in the State of Florida,

Husband paid Wife the full amount of alimony and child support due her i.e.,
$3,500.00 per month alimony and $3,000.00 per month child support. The trial court
further found that the Decree of Divorce entered in this case in specific detail, sets
forth the clear agreement of the parties that travel to and from the State of Florida by
the parties' children and in certain circumstances, Wife, was treated and addressed and
that travel in fact occurred for which deductions from alimony by Husband as
authorized by the Decree of Divorce were made. Findings of Fact, \ 7; R. 492.
54.

The trial court found that while in the State of Florida, the following facts

were established by a fair preponderance of the evidence:
a.

That the only residence of Wife and her children was the residence

of Mr. Adams at 642 Fort Smith Blvd., Deltona, Florida 32738.
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b.

That Mr. Adams provided Wife with a key to his residence which

wasfreelyaccessible by her and her children without any permission being required
of or from Mr. Adams.
c.

That Wife did not contribute to the payment of any indebtedness

against the Adams residence, utilities at the Adams residence, nor was she restricted
in any way from using Mr. Adams' telephone at his residence and that she did so
without charge. The trial court found that Wife's children likewise had free and
unrestricted access to the Adams' residence without the payment of any consideration
and used utilities, including the telephone, although Mr. Adams did request that the
children pay for any long distance telephone calls.
d.

That Wife parked moving trucks at the residence of Mr. Adams

which contained various personal property, furniture, etc.,- until such vehicles were
impounded by the moving truck rental company, and further that such items were later
placed in storage by Wife until such property was subsequently removed and returned
to the State of Utah. The Court finds in addition that Wife, Wife's children and the
children's friend kept personal effects, and certain items of furniture, including a
mattress at Mr. Adams' residence during the period of time Wife and her children
were residents at Mr. Adams' address.
e.

That Wife cooked meals at the Adams residence and that on

occasion they ate together with Wife's family and further thatfromtime to time Mr.
Adams, the Wife and Wife's family, engaged in recreational activities of various
kinds.
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f.

That Wife enrolled her children in school in Florida and that the

children in fact attended school there and further that from time to time, Mr. Adams
and the Wife assisted Wife's children with homework and school assignments.
g.

That Wife and her children had sleeping arrangements whereby

one male child and a male friend slept in one bedroom at the Adams residence; that
the children and Wife slept on mattresses and/or a couch in the living and/or dining
room, and that one female child slept on a couch.
h.

That while the children did not observe any sexual intimacy

between Mr. Adams and Wife, at least one of the parties' children did observe hand
holding, kissing and other evidence of affection between Mr. Adams and Wife.
i.

That during the period of Wife' s residency in the Adams residence

in the State of Florida, Mr. Adams and Wife engaged in considerable sexual
intercourse and were otherwise intimate with each other.
j.

That Wife received mail at both her own post office box and

through Mr. Adams' post office box which mail included credit card billings,
advertisements, correspondence from Husband to the children, and other
correspondence.
k.

That Wife and her family attended church services while in Florida

and on occasion were accompanied by Mr. Adams.
1.

That while Wife and Mr. Adams planned marriage, their plans did

not materialize and their relationship terminated when Wife and her family returned
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to the State of Utah at or following Thanksgiving, 1998. Findings of Fact, \ 8; R. 493-95.
55.

That U.C.A. § 30-3-5 as well as paragraph 18 of the Decree entered in

this case provides for the termination of alimony in the event of Wife's cohabitation.
Conclusions of Law, 12; R. 499.
56.

That Wife did cohabitate with Mr. Adams in the State of Florida from

October 1, 1998 through the Thanksgiving holiday, 1998 and as such, all alimony
terminated as provided by law on October 1,1998. Conclusions of Law, \ 3; R. 499.
57.

That the trial court granted Husband's Petition to Modify as to alimony.

Conclusions of Law, f 4; R. 499.
58.

That due to Wife' s cohabitation with Mr. Adams, Husband is entitled to

and was awarded a judgment against Wife for alimony paid to herfromNovember 1,
1998 through October, 2000, in the sum of $67,854.00. Conclusions ofLaw, \ 5; R.
499.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In approximately March of 1997 Wife and Mr. Adams became acquainted at a
seminar in Denver, Colorado. See Statement of Facts, f 3. (hereinafter "SOF'). These
two individuals became intimately involved, engaging in sexual relations and
intercourse and continued to meet and develop their relationship, both emotionally and
physically on many occasions thereafter. See SOF, ^f 3-13.
Husband and Wife were divorced on or about October 13,1998. See SOF, 12.
Beginning in 1997 and continuing through the end of 1998, Wife and Mr. Adams
continued to develop their relationship. See SOF,fflj3-14. In fact, Mr. Adams flew
21

to Utah on one occasion to attend the L.D.S. missionary farewell of one of Wife's
children. See SOF, 130. Mr. Adams also came to Utah and stayed for an extended
period of time in the summer of 1998. See SOF, 1 12. Wife and Mr. Adams became
engaged on July 11,1998, in Salt Lake City, and Mr. Adams thereafter began to assist
Wife to make and complete the move to Florida with her children. See SOF, H 13-15.
Mr. Adams even went to Florida with one of Wife's children, Derrick Dibble, prior
to the commencement of the fall school term and enrolled him in school. See SOF,
112.
Mr. Adams then flew back to Utah and in approximately September of 1998,
Wife, Mr. Adams, Wife's daughter Aarika and Aarika's boyfriend Matt Zerkle, drove
two separate U-haul trucks with all of Wife and her children's belongings in them, to
Florida, where she intended to live. See SOF, H 14-15.3 Wife maintained no
residence in Utah or anywhere other than Florida for that matter. See SOF, 115.
When Wife arrived in Florida, she and her five children commenced their residence
with Mr. Adams in the Adams home. See SOF, H 17-18. If she did not reside in
Florida at Mr. Adams' residence in Deltona, where did she reside? Not only is the
Record clear, she could not assert any other plausible, believable or even fabricated
answer. That is simply because there was none. Mr. Adams gave Wife a key to his
home, and supported Wife and the children's family expenses including the mortgage
and utilities. See SOF, H 20,28. In turn, Wife supplied some groceries for the family

3

It appears from a review of the record that Wife's other children arrived in Florida by airplane.
R. 515: 23 (vol. II).
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and cooked meals for the family at Mr. Adams' home. See SOF, ^ 21. The family had
unrestricted access to the home, and in fact received mail at Mr. Adams' post office
box in Florida. See SOF,fflf22-23. Throughout this period of time Wife and Mr.
Adams continuously engaged in intimate relations, including sexual intercourse. See
SOF,^ 24.
Mr. Adams encountered problems related to the closing of the home he was in
the process of purchasing for the family to live in after he and Wife were married. See
SOF, | 27. Although Wife claims she and her children intended to live in the home
separate from Mr. Adams until the marriage, it is clear Wife and Mr. Adams were
embarking on a life together as a couple and as a family which included her five
children. See SOF, 127. Wife, Mr. Adams, and the children participated in activities
that families normally participate in, including movies, eating dinner together,
attending church, and participating in recreational pursuits. See SOF,ffl[25, 29-30.
Wife and Mr. Adams' relationship began to deteriorate in November 1998, and
on Thanksgiving Day 1998 Wife and the children returned to the State of Utah. See
SOF, 117. Wife withdrew her children from school in Florida, returned to the State
of Utah, enrolled them in school in Utah and leased a home. See SOF, 116. Even at
this time Wife continued her relationship with Mr. Adams, she did not return the
engagement ring he gave her when she accepted his marriage proposal, and the trial
court found Mr. Adams' testimony believable and credible, including the fact that
Wife and Mr. Adams' relationship did not end until December 1998 or January 1999.
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See SOF,fflf44,47. In fact, Mr. Adamsflewto Utah in December 1998 to see Wife
and her children and gave Wife a necklace as a Christmas gift. See SOF, ^ 44.
Wife cohabited with her then fiance, Mr. Adams, while living in the State of
Floridafromat least September 1998 - November 1998. See SOF, 156. Wife moved
to the State of Florida with the intent and expectation that they would live together as
a married couple, with her children, in a marital household. In light of the
overwhelming testimony presented establishing Wife and Mr. Adams' continuing
relationship, their common residency, and sexual contact while living together, the
trial court correctly determined Wife cohabited within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(9) and relevant Utah case law. The trial court had no option under the
evidence presented other than to terminate Husband's alimony obligation as of
November 1998.
ARGUMENT
I. WIFE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Wife's appellate brief falls light years short of meeting her burden and oft
repeated duty and obligation to marshal the evidence. Accordingly, under well-settled
Utah law, this Court must conclude that the Record supports the trial court's findings,
conclusions and ultimate decision.
Wife's failure to marshal the evidence is fatal to her appeal, even without an
examination of the overwhelming evidence in support of the trial court's findings,
conclusions and Ruling. Continuing a relationship that began in 1997, Wife cohabited
with Mr. Adams in the State of Floridafromapproximately September 1998 through
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November 1998, thus terminating Husband's alimony obligation and resulting in the
overpayment of alimony by Husband to Wife.
A critical and fundamental requirement when challenging a trial court's findings
of fact is to marshal the evidence supporting those findings. See Moon v. Moon, 1999
UT App 12, f 24. There, this Court reiterated,
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the
duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of
this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Id. (citations omitted). An appellant who merely reargues her position on appeal fails
to meet her duty and burden. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P. 2d 598, 603
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). An appellant similarly fails to marshal the evidence on appeal
when she merely recites thefindingson point and highlights the evidence she deems
contrary to thefindings.See Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P. 2d 508,516 (Utah Ct. App.
1996); see also Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P. 2d 603, 606 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In the case subjudice, Wife does not assume the role of devil's advocate, but
chooses instead to suggest to this Court each of the reasons she believes the trial court
made an erroneous decision. Wife's inability to extricate herselffromher own shoes
and marshal the evidence as mandated in decision after decision of this Court, serves
no purpose other than to rehash Wife' s testimony which the trial court, justifiably and
correctly, found totally incredible.
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Wife has not presented in "comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she]
resists[,]" rather Wife fails in certain instances to even recite the findings as they apply
to cohabitation. Wife utterly fails to point in the Record to the avalanche of evidence
in support of the trial court's well-reasoned findings and conclusion that Wife engaged
in cohabitation without ceremonial marriage and as such, Husband's alimony
obligation ceased.
On the issue of cohabitation Wife merely regurgitates the reasons the trial court
found she and Mr. Adams cohabited in Florida, and pays short shrift, at best, to the
evidence supporting the trial court's determination. See generally Briefof Appellant
(hereinafter "Wife's Brief). Wife's brief is bereft of the overwhelming evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and conclusion on cohabitation. In truth and in
fact, the trial court made detailed findings on the issue of cohabitation and Wife
presented to no evidence to the contrary to overcome the preponderance of the
evidentiary burden met by Husband. See SOF,fflf48-58. The reason for her failure
is obvious, she cannot overcome the only conclusion demanded by the evidence, that
is that she chose to cohabit with Mr. Adams and her marshaling of the evidence would
support no other conclusion.
Wife's attempt to align her position with that of cases like Pendleton, discussed
in more detail infra, is nothing more than the manufacturing of facts not found credible
by the trial court. For example, Wife claims that because she was living with Mr.
Adams in the State of Florida for approximately two months and ten days, as the wife
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did in Pendleton, where that court found no cohabitation, surely this Court should find
likewise. Wife, however, once again fails to marshal the evidence as found by the trial
court in support of her common residency with Mr. Adams, including the continuous
nature of the relationship, the engagement of marriage between the parties, and the
most compelling factor distinguishing Wife's casefromevery other cohabitation case
in Utah, that she maintained no separate residence. See SOF, ^ 15. Wife in fact
packed up her belongings and her five children, withdrew themfromschool in Utah,
and in fact sent one child ahead with Mr. Adams and permitted and supported Mr.
Adams to perform the fatherly task of enrolling her child in school in Florida.
Conveniently, and in direct violation of the plethora of cases from this Court
mandating the appellant's marshaling task, she utterly failed to bring these facts, in
support of the trial court's findings, to the Court's attention. Clearly, Wife has not met
her burden to marshal the evidence on appeal. She did not play "devil's advocate"
and in fact she indefatigably continues to cling to her trial testimony, which if the trial
court were to have accepted as true, would have had to disregard not only the truthful
testimony of her ex-fiance Mr. Adams, but also her own witnesses, her children, and
her self-proclaimed best friend and confidant Jaylynn Cobbley.
Wife's failure to marshal the evidence provides a sufficient basis in and of itself
to deny her appeal. However, the evidence relied on by the trial court in support of
its findings and conclusion on cohabitation absolutely conform to Utah law, justify no
other result, and sounds the death knell of her appeal.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED
THAT WIFE COHABITED WITH HER THEN FIANCE MR. ADAMS
FROM APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1998
THROUGH NOVEMBER 1998.
This case more clearly than any other in the Utah case analogs, illustrates the
intended application of the cohabitation statue, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9), which
results in the termination of alimony. Wife's attempt to spin the facts otherwise does
nothing more than reveal the incredibility and inconsistency of her evidence presented
to the trial court. As such, the trial court correctly determined that Wife cohabited
within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, the trial court terminated alimony as
of November 1998. Under the state of the evidence, the trial court could not have
found otherwise.
Contrary to the position argued in Wife's brief, "cohabitation" as applied to the
termination of alimony has not been clearly defined either in Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(9) or applicable case law. See Wife's Brief, p. 8. Admittedly, the Code is clear that,
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the
former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000). Moreover, the Court in Haddow v. Haddow, 707
P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985) did set forth a two part test for cohabitation under Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9): (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact.4 The Haddow
Court was equally clear that once residency is established, alimony automatically

4

The Haddow Court defined "common residency" as, "the sharing of a common abode that both
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time[;]" and "sexual
contact" as, "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing
between husband and wife." Id. at 672.
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terminates unless the cohabitating spouse can show the relationship is "without sexual
contact." Id. at 672.
The complexity and fact-intensive nature of the cohabitation determination
under the Haddow test is illustrated through an amalgamation of Utah cases that set
forth various considerations to determine whether a person has cohabited within the
meaning of the statute. The weight and consideration given to each factor in a
particular case serves to illustrate that each case is factually distinctive.
In Haddow, the Court determined the applicability of the cohabitation statute
to a term in the divorce decree ordering the wife to pay the husband his interest in their
home, which she remained in possession of pursuant to the decree of divorce, upon,
inter alia, her cohabitation. See Haddow, 707 P. 2d at 671. There the Court found
cohabitation did not occur even though the testimony elicited at trial established that
wife's boyfriend spent most of his free time with her; ate dinner at her home often;
stayed at wife's home until latefrequentlyduring the week and then returned in the
morning for coffee; stayed the night at wife's home approximately once a week; kept
a few toiletries and clothes at wife's house and she sometimes did his laundry and took
his clothes to the dry cleaners; sometimes showered and changed at wife's house
before dinner; received mail for a couple of bank accounts at wife's house. See id. at
670-71,673.
However, the determinative factor and the critical circumstance that
distinguishes Haddowfromthe instant case is that the wife's boyfriend maintained a
separate residence from the wife, and the boyfriend spent no time at the home when
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the wife was absent and did not have a key to the house. See id. at 673-74. The Court
rationalized that "a resident will come and go as he pleases in his own home, while a
visitor, however regular and frequent, will schedule his visits to coincide with the
presence of the person he is visiting." Id. at 673.
In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court
reversed the trial court for its failure to find cohabitation under the particular facts of
that case. See id. at 161. Specifically, Pendleton relied and elaborated on Haddow,
explaining, "[common residency] implies continuity, not simply a habit of visiting or
a sojourn." Id. at 1605. The Pendleton court also illustrated the case-by-case nature
of a cohabitation determination.

"Although neither the presence of portable

possessions nor the sharing of living expenses is dispositive, either my nonetheless be
indicative of maintaining a shared household and be regarded as some evidence of
residency." Id. at 160-61 (citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)). The court also stated, "[w]hile it is true that [the boyfriend] did not assist in
any way with the cost of maintaining [wife] 's home, the sharing of living expenses is
not required to show residency in this context." Id. (citing Haddow).
The "largely undisputed" facts in Pendleton establishing cohabitation included:
wife's boyfriend stayed with her ninety percent of the time when he was not traveling
with his job; he had his own key to wife's home; he came and wentfromwife's home
even when she was not there; and the boyfriend had no other residence until the day

5

Citing Haddow, 707 P. 2d at 672.
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before wife's husbandfiledthe petition to terminate alimony6. See Pendleton, 918 P.
2d at 161.
The facts of the instant case fit squarely within this Court's analysis of the
cohabitation statute in the case of Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), a case Wife conveniently fails to cite to this Court. There, the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of cohabitation where,
On February 7,1993,... [wife] moved to Boulder, Colorado, where she stayed
with [her boyfriend] at his condominium for two weeks before obtaining a
second condominium [in the same complex] of her own nearby. The trial court
found that, over the next few months, Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes 'lived together
as though they were husband and wife' - and that they had sexual intercourse,
shared living expenses, had open access to the other's condominium, ate
together, maintained clothing in the same condominium, and used the same
furniture.
Id. at 910-11, 917-18.7 Relying on Haddow, this Court affirmed the trial court's
finding that wife and her boyfriend "' in effect resided together,' even though they had
separate condominiums in the same condominium complex." Id. at 917-18. (emphasis
added). The additional factors, important to the trial court and which this Court based
its affirmance on included: the couple had a sexual relationship; shared living
expenses; enjoyed unrestricted access to each others' condominiums; ate meals
together and shared food expenses; kept their clothes in the same condominium; used

6

The court opined that wife's boyfriend likely rented an apartment knowing of the impending
petition and therefore, questioned the "genuineness" of the rental and discounted the significance of the
rented apartment. See id at 161 n2.
7

The wife in Sigg maintained that she maintained a separate residence, shared few expenses with
her boyfriend, and the two did not keep clothes in each others' condominiums. She did admit that her
boyfriend had open access to her condominium, they visited frequently and did have intercourse. See id
at911n4.
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the same furniture; and "otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife." See
id. at 918.
Wife hangs her hat on Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P. 2d 1387 (Utah 1980). See
Wife's Brief, pp. 9-10,13-14. The fatal flaw in her analysis and argument lies in the
Utah Supreme Court's explicit holding in Bair v. Bair8, that Knuteson is the exception
and not the rule. See Bair, 737 P. 2d at 179. The Bair Court explained the
"exceptional circumstances" of Knuteson that justified a departurefromthe intent of
the cohabitation statute which is "to prevent injustice to a spouse whofrequentlypays
through the nose, so to speak, to an undeserving ex-mate."9 In addition to the fact that
the wife's desperate circumstances in Knuteson were occasioned solely due to the
husband's failure to pay alimony,10
that the marital termination agreement eliminated some of [wife] 's demands in
exchange for $7,000 in spousal support payments; that this amount was to be
paid in installments; that the payments were characterized as alimony to give
defendant tax spousal support payments; andfinally,that [husband] knew about
[wife]'s alliance with another man prior to entering into the agreement.
Id. at 179. Not a single exceptional circumstance in Knuteson exists in the instant
case.

8

737 P. 2d 177, 179 (Utah 1987)(fmding cohabitation provisions of the Title 30 did not apply to
that case because the monies at issue should have properly been characterized as property settlement not
alimony)(opinion by C.J. Howell, Asso. C.J. Stewart, Justices Howe, Durham, and Zimmerman concur).
9

Knuteson, 619 ?. 2d at 1389.

10

Knuteson, 619 P. 2d 1389 (explaining alimony termination statute does not apply to situation
occasioned by husband's failure to pay "nor does the statute seem to apply to an indiscretion invited by a
temporary emergency situation occasioned by unlivable conditions that is apt to happen for example as
might be the case in a bomb shelter or in a home to which one may have ben removed in a dangerous area
evacuation operation"). See id.
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Furthermore, in Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P. 2d 533 (Utah 1983), another case
Wife fails to candidly cite in her brief, the Utah Supreme Court further explained and
distinguished Knuteson and illustrated the Court's intended meaning of "common
residency" under the alimony termination statute. The Court first noted that alimony
is automatically terminated once residence with another is established "unless the
person receiving alimony can show that the relationship is 'without sexual contact.'"
Id. at 534. The Court then went on to explicate the highly unusual circumstances of
Knuteson which the Bair Court later affirmed, 1) that the wife in that case was
"driven" to live with her neighbor due solely to husband's non-payment of alimony;
and 2) the woman, who maintained and spent the majority of her time, at her separate
residence, did not establish a common residence with the neighbor. See id.
More recently, this Court in Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), that Court found the two-part test set forth in Haddow and its progeny and the
definitions of "residing with" and "sexual contact," applicable to a determination of
whether a payor spouse's alimony obligation should terminate where a payee spouse
is found to cohabitate with another individual.'' In Hill, this Court specifically found,
"[w]e divine no legislative intent to abrogate the case law defining cohabitation in the
alimony-termination context." Id. at 868 (deciding definitional issue of cohabitation
in alimony termination context, where appellant argued the definition of cohabitation
11

The 1995 amendment deleted subsection (6) and added (9) as it currently appears,

[a]ny order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000).
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in the Cohabitant Abuse Act should apply). Notably, in Hill, this Court recognized the
Supreme Court's admonition that, '"[t]o some extent, the meaning of the term
[cohabitation] depends upon the context in which it is used.'" Id. {quoting Haddow,
707 P. 2d at 671). It follows, whether cohabitation has occurred such that alimony
termination is warranted is also highly dependent upon the context and facts of each
particular case.
In the instant case, the facts supporting cohabitation are similar if not more
compelling than in the Sigg case. Wife moved, with her five children, to Florida in
September 1998 with the intention to live with her fiance Mr. Adams. See SOF, ^{14.
The family resided with Mr. Adams in Florida until Thanksgiving Day 1998, when
Wife returned to Utah with her children. See SOF, f 17. At no time while Wife and her
family lived in Florida did she have any residence other than that of Mr. Adams. See
SOF, | t 17,52. To suggest at trial, to avoid the early termination of alimony, that she
was nothing more than "friends" with a man to whom she was engaged, that she
ceased having intercourse with him after her divorce when she engaged in frequent
and ongoing sexual intercourse with him while she was married, that she did not hold
his hand or kiss him or have any intimate contact with him at all flies in the face of
Mr. Adams' testimony, the testimony of her own son Derrick Dibble and common
sense. See SOF, TfJ 3-47. Such a claim or series of claims defies logic, the Record and
is nothing short of ludicrous and is indeed, absurd.
Additionally, Wife cannot claim she was "driven" to live with Mr. Adams, in
as much as she was receiving over $6,000 monthly in tax free alimony and child
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support, and it is undisputed that while in Florida living with Mr. Adams, he covered
all of the family's living expenses as he understood he and Wife were to be married.
SeeSOF^lS.
Further, and perhaps most telling of the rationale behind the trial court's
determination that Wife' s testimony at trial was totally unbelievable and without merit
is the following: Wife took the stand in the morning on thefirstday of trial March 21,
2001. R. 515: 24 (vol. I). At no time during her testimony, on direct examination or
on cross-examination, did she once mention any physical abuse by Mr. Adams, or that
she personally attempted to and did in fact obtain housing in Utah in October of 1998
when she accompanied the children to Utah for Husband's wedding to his new wife.
See SOF,^ 41.
Following Wife's testimony, Husband called Mr. Adams to the stand and he
testified to his and Wife's extensive sexual relationsfromthe day they first met. See
SOF,fflf3-30. Wife's counsel did not question any witness as to any alleged physical
abuse of Wife, as none existed. See SOF, ^ 42. Following Mr. Adams' testimony,
Wife, not Husband, called the parties' son Derrick Dibble to testify to the relationship
between Wife and Mr. Adams while living in Florida. See SOF, ff 36-37. On
Husband's cross-examination, Derrick Dibble testified, in direct contradiction to his
mother's testimony, that not only did his mother and Mr. Adams hold hands, but he
is sure he observed them kissing, and had no idea whether they were sleeping together,
because "tried to stay out of that stuff." See SOF,fflj36-37.
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Suddenly, and after a recess over lunch, Wife testified to a controlling and
verbally and physically abusive relationship with Mr. Adams. See SOF, f 41.
Suddenly, Wife is found testifying that in October of 1998 when she accompanied her
children to Utah for their father's wedding, she sought and obtained housing in Utah
because of the alleged abuse. See SOF, ^ 41. On cross-examination, however, Wife
changed her story yet again, and testified that the alleged physical abuse did not start
until she returned to Florida after the October 1998 wedding. See SOF, ^ 41. Her
attempts to change the focus of her earlier testimony and that of every witness who
testified, while convenient, simply did not carry the day and will not pass muster.
Wife cohabited with Mr. Adams and no other conclusion, based upon the evidence,
could be reached. In all candor, a clearer case of cohabitation could not be conceived.

CONCLUSION
Wife should not be allowed to engage in cohabitation, while continuing to
punish Husband through his payment of alimony. Wife, through her cohabitation with
Mr. Adams effectively enjoyed the support of two "husbands" while pocketing over
$6,000 taxfree,$ 13,000 in just two and one-half months. Utah's cohabitation statute,
as related to alimony, was expressly promulgated to thwart this kind of disingenuous
act. This Court should deny Wife's appeal and reaffirm not only the sound public
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policy behind the cohabitation statute but the considered decision of the trial court.
Husband should be awarded his attorneys fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
Dated this ^ ^ a y o f July 2002.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS &JSWENSON

CLARK W. SESSIONS
T. MICKELL JIMENEZ ROWE
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
Carlos M. Dibble, M.D.
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